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THE MEANING OF ‘ ‘ INTOXICATION’ ’
IN AUSTRALIAN CRIMINAL CASES:
ORIGINS AND OPERATION
Julia Quilter* and Luke McNamara**
Although alcohol and drug use features prominently in many areas of criminal
offending, there has been limited investigation of how the effects of alcohol and
other drugs are treated by criminal laws and the criminal justice system. This
article examines the framing of judicial inquiries about ‘‘intoxication’’ in
criminal cases in Australia. It illustrates the diverse types of evidence that may
(or may not) be available to judges and juries when faced with the task of
determining whether a person was relevantly ‘‘intoxicated.’’ It shows that in the
absence of legislative guidance on how the task should be approached, courts
tend to assign only a relatively marginal role to medical and scientific expert
evidence, and frame the question as one that can be answered by applying
common knowledge about the effects of alcohol and other drugs. The article
examines the adequacy of this approach, given the weak foundation for
assuming that the relationship between intoxication and the complex cognitive
processes on which tribunals of fact are often required to reach conclusions (such
as intent formation) is within the lay knowledge held by jurors and judges.
*Julia Quilter is an Associate Professor in the School of Law, and a member of the Legal
Intersections Research Centre, at the University of Wollongong, Australia. Her research
addresses patterns of criminalization including the origins and impact of criminal law and
police responses to alcohol- and drug-related violence and antisocial behavior.
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which this article builds, and thank Jai Clark for excellent research assistance.
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examines the drivers, modalities, and effects of criminalization as a public policy tool and
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I N TRODUCT ION
Normative questions about what sorts of criminal law significance should
be attached to intoxication continue to be debated in Australia—most
visibly, in recent years, in the context of policy debates over how to reduce
alcohol- (and drug-) fuelled violence.1 These are important debates, but
one of their features is a tendency to underappreciate that criminal courts,
at all levels, are already required, on a daily basis, to consider the relevance
of evidence that a person was intoxicated at the time of the alleged com-
mission of a criminal offense. Little attention has been paid to how courts
approach the decision making required in these cases, or how they conceive
and define the concept of ‘‘intoxication,’’ on which a great deal can turn.2
Previous research by the authors has catalogued and analyzed legislative
approaches to the concept of ‘‘intoxication.’’3 Two of the findings of that
review are relevant at the outset of this article. First, although the word
‘‘intoxication’’ has traditionally been associated with the effects of alcohol
consumption, it is now routinely used more broadly in Australian crim-
inal laws to refer to the effects of alcohol and a long list of other drugs.4
1. See, e.g., NSW SENT’G COUNCIL, ALCOHOL AND DRUG FUELLED VIOLENCE (Aug.
2015); also Julia Quilter, One Punch Laws, Mandatory Minimums and ‘‘Alcohol-Fuelled’’ as an
Aggravating Factor: Implications for NSW Criminal Law, 3(1) INT’L J. FOR CRIME, JUST. &
SOC. DEMOCRACY 81 (2014).
2. This article is concerned with self-induced (or ‘‘voluntary’’) intoxication, recognizing
that ‘‘involuntary’’ intoxication is treated differently in Australia in criminal laws (see SIMON
BRONITT & BERNADETTE MCSHERRY, PRINCIPLES OF CRIMINAL LAW 299 (4th ed. 2017)),
as it is in many other jurisdictions (see, e.g., Model Penal Code, § 2.08(4); discussed in
MARKUS D. DUBBER, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE MODEL PENAL CODE 73 (2nd ed. 2015)).
3. Julia Quilter, Luke McNamara, Kate Seear, & Robin Room, Criminal Law and the
Effects of Alcohol and Other Drugs: A National Study of the Significance of ‘‘Intoxication’’ Under
Australian Legislation, 39(3) U. N.S.W. L.J. 913 (2016).
4. For example, s 428A of the Crimes Act 1900 (NSW) states: ‘‘‘intoxication’ means
intoxication because of the influence of alcohol, a drug or any other substance,’’ and ‘‘drug’’
includes a drug within the meaning of the Drug Misuse and Trafficking Act 1985 (NSW), and
a poison, restricted substance, or drug of addiction within the meaning of the Poisons and
Therapeutic Goods Act 1966 (NSW); see also Julia Quilter, Luke McNamara, Kate Seear, &
Robin Room, The Definition and Significance of ‘‘Intoxication’’ in Australian Criminal Law:
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Second, although the concept of ‘‘intoxication’’ is implicated in a large
number and a broad range of criminal laws, there is a widespread pattern
of underdefinition in Australian legislation.5 One of the inevitable con-
sequences of the frequent failure of legislatures to provide guidance on
context-appropriate criteria for assessing whether a person is relevantly
‘‘intoxicated’’ is that the burden falls on decision makers in the criminal
justice system.
Australia is a federation, and under the Australian Constitution,6 crim-
inal law and procedure is primarily the responsibility of the governments of
states and territories rather than the federal government. To undertake
a national assessment of the role being played by courts in criminal case
decision making in relation to intoxication, coverage across all Australian
jurisdictions was considered essential. This study involved collecting all
decisions in which the intoxication of the accused, the victim, or a witness
formed part of the evidence in the case—from the highest criminal appel-
late court in each state and territory,7 and the High Court of Australia, for
the five-year period January 2010 to December 2014.
This article8 examines the resulting dataset of 327 appellate court deci-
sions to investigate the following questions:
A Case Study of Queensland’s ‘‘Safe Night Out’’ Legislation, 16(2) QUEENSL. U. TECH. L. REV.
42, 47 (2016).
5. Quilter et al., supra note 3, at 935.
6. Commonwealth of Australia Constitution Act 1900 (Imp) 63 & 64 Vict., ch 12, s 9 (U.K.).
7. Australian Capital Territory (ACT) Court of Appeal, New South Wales (NSW)
Court of Criminal Appeal, Northern Territory (NT) Court of Criminal Appeal, Queens-
land (Qld) Court of Appeal, South Australia (SA) Court of Criminal Appeal, Tasmanian
(Tas) Court of Criminal Appeal, Victorian (Vic) Court of Appeal, Western Australia (WA)
Court of Appeal.
8. Elsewhere, the authors (with others) have reported on what the dataset reveals about
the major offense categories in which intoxication evidence is raised in Australian criminal
courts, and the multiple purposes for which intoxication is considered—including the
admissibility of police interviews, the credibility and reliability of witness testimony,
adjudication on the criminal responsibility of the accused, and determination of sentence
for convicted offenders: Luke McNamara, Julia Quilter, Kate Seear, & Robin Room,
Evidence of Intoxication in Australian Criminal Courts: A Complex Variable with Multiple
Effects, 43(1) MON. U.L. REV. 148 (2017). There, attention was drawn to the particular
challenges posed by evidence of the complainant’s intoxication in sexual assault (rape)
matters. It also demonstrated that, in the sentencing context, courts attempt to balance
a ‘‘general rule’’ that offender intoxication should not be regarded as a mitigating factor,
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1. How is ‘‘intoxication’’ defined in criminal court proceedings in
Australia?
2. What evidence do Australian courts rely on to establish whether
a person was relevantly intoxicated?
3. What sorts of knowledge inform the challenging task of assessing
whether and how the consumption of alcohol, or other drugs, is
relevant to key elements of criminal responsibility, such as whether
the accused acted with the requisite mens rea?
4. Are current practices adequate, and do Australian appellate courts
provide sufficient guidance to magistrates and judges?
The article’s findings and analysis are presented in three parts. Part I
presents the qualitative findings of an examination of the collected cases,
focused on explaining the means by which intoxication is established in
criminal cases, and the language used to articulate ‘‘degrees’’ of intoxication.
Attention is drawn to the often partial, fragmentary, and imprecise evidence
on which courts are required to rely in making decisions about the nature
and criminal law relevance of a person’s intoxication. Part II considers the
ramifications of definitional ambiguity and evidentiary incompleteness for
how criminal courts (judges and juries) tackle the complex task of assessing
a person’s level of intoxication, and adjudicating on the relevance of this
assessment for the prosecution’s ability to prove its case beyond reasonable
doubt. This part of the article is organized around a case study of 66 cases
from the study’s dataset, in which intoxication was in issue in relation to the
accused’s criminal responsibility (including cases involving the so-called
intoxication ‘‘defense’’9). Employing a theoretical framework drawn from
the work of Mariana Valverde10 and Arlie Loughnan,11 it shows that
tribunals of fact are frequently directed by judges (and legal practitioners)
with a number of recognized exceptions, where the circumstances or implications of the
offender’s intoxication are regarded as grounds for some mitigation.
9. In Australia, as in the United States and elsewhere, the phrase intoxication ‘‘defense’’ is
used loosely to refer to the rules that govern the opportunity of the accused to raise evidence
of intoxication to negate the prosecution’s assertion that s/he acted with the requisite mens
rea. The parameters of the ‘‘defense’’ have been restricted by legislation in many jurisdic-
tions in both countries, including by limiting the ‘‘defense’’ to specific intent crimes; see, e.g.,
California Penal Code, § 29.4(b); Crimes Act 1900 (NSW) s 428C.
10. MARIANA VALVERDE, LAW’S DREAM OF A COMMON KNOWLEDGE (2003).
11. ARLIE LOUGHNAN, MANIFEST MADNESS: MENTAL INCAPACITY IN THE CRIMINAL
LAW (2012).
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to draw on ‘‘common knowledge’’ or ‘‘lay knowledge’’ about the effects of
alcohol and other drugs, and to give meaning to the legal concept of
intoxication. Part III of the article examines the effects of the validation
of common knowledge as the source of the concept of intoxication, focus-
ing on two important features: (1) a tendency to marginalize the evidence
of medical and scientific experts as ill-suited to the determination of the
legal issues in question; and (2) judicial deployment of ‘‘tests’’ for intoxi-
cation that focus on a person’s observable motor functions. In particular,
this part of the article considers the appropriateness of using such ap-
proaches for assessing complex executive cognition functions associated
with intent formation.
I . DEF IN ING AND EV IDENC ING ‘ ‘ I NTOX ICAT ION ’ ’
This part of the article demonstrates that the cases in our Australian dataset
revealed no standard ‘‘check list’’ of evidence for proving intoxication.
There is considerable case-to-case variation, and discretionary subjective
assessments are commonplace. Imprecise colloquial language about intox-
ication was employed frequently, both by witnesses and by judges.
Courtroom assessments about intoxication typically involve three ques-
tions. First, how much alcohol (or other drug(s)) did the person consume?
Secondly, what effects did the consumption of alcohol or other drugs have
on the person? Thirdly, what bearing does this evidence have on a relevant
legal inquiry? In relation to this third point, such inquiries include:
 Is the witness credible and/or their testimony reliable?
 Did the accused have the requisite mens rea?
 Did the complainant (in a sexual assault case) consent?
 Did alcohol or other drugs play a causal role in the offending (with
possible implications for sentencing)?
These legal inquiries are frequently difficult to answer with confidence,
whether because of the nature of the available evidence, or the complexity
of the matter to be determined, or both. This claim will be supported in
Parts II and III of the article via a case study of what the judgments reveal
about the intoxication–mens rea relationship.
The review of 327 Australian appellate decisions for this study revealed
that the available evidence to determine if a person should be regarded as
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‘‘intoxicated’’ for a particular criminal law purpose took a variety of forms
and was produced from a variety of sources or ‘‘authors.’’ These appro-
aches included:
 biological detection (e.g., blood alcohol concentration)
 self- and/or witness reports of consumption
 self- and/or witness reports of behavior or ‘‘state’’
 appearance, behavioral assessments by police officers
 CCTV footage and video recordings of police interviews
 assessments by medical, toxicological, or psychiatric experts
 judicial assessments of the available evidence.
In the cases reviewed, there was a wide variation in the nature, volume,
and quality of the relevant evidence of the accused or victim’s intoxication.
Surprisingly, given the high stakes involved in criminal cases concerned
with serious charges,12 it appeared that courts were often required to make
complex and important decisions about whether a person was relevantly
intoxicated with limited evidence. For example, in the Queensland case of
R v. Baker,13 where the charge was attempted murder, one of the central
issues at trial was whether the accused was so intoxicated that he did not
have the requisite mens rea (intent to kill). Yet the available evidence
consisted only of patchy and vague self- and witness reports on the accu-
sed’s consumption (‘‘grog, pot and a bit of ecstasy’’;14 ‘‘10 Tooheys
New’’15), the accused’s rating of his intoxication on a 10-point scale
(‘‘6, 7’’16), and the evidence of a police officer that he did not observe
‘‘any indicia of intoxication.’’17 There was no blood alcohol concentration
result or toxicology report.18 It might be expected that for serious offenses
such as murder, the relative precision of a blood alcohol concentration
reading would be commonplace, yet the review of cases completed for this
study showed this was not the case. Blood alcohol concentration readings
12. Of the 327 cases in this study’s dataset, 80% involved homicide, sexual assault, or
aggravated assault charges; McNamara et al., supra note 8, at 154.
13. R v. Baker [2014] QCA 5.
14. Id. at { 79.
15. Id. ‘‘Tooheys New’’ is a well-known Australian brand of regular strength beer.
16. Id.
17. Id. at { 78.
18. Id. at { 79.
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were available in only a minority of cases, and most of these were driving
harm cases.19
The case of R v. Martin20 was an exception to the general pattern
identified. In this case, the court had the benefit of a variety of types and
sources of evidence going to the question of intoxication: a blood alcohol
concentration reading for the accused (and the victim); expert evidence
(from a government medical officer) on the likely effects of the accused’s
blood alcohol concentration on his functionality and cognition; evidence
provided by the first police officer on the scene about the accused’s
demeanor and behavior; evidence provided by a police scientific officer;
the evidence of bar staff at the licensed premises where the accused had
been drinking; the evidence of a witness about the accused’s intoxication;
the accused’s own evidence; and the trial judge’s assessment based on all
of the available evidence.21 Parts II and III of this article will consider
whether the availability of this breadth of evidence produces qualitatively
better determinations on the question of intoxication.
Expert evidence on the effects of alcohol and other drugs featured unevenly
in the cases reviewed. Where it was present, it typically took the form of an
explanation of the abilities/inabilities that a person could be expected to have,
at the level of intoxication the accused was found (or estimated) to have. For
example, in R v. Mitchell 22 the accused had consumed alcohol (methylated
spirits) and cannabis. He said in a police interview that he had no memory of
the relevant events (in which he had bashed the victim to death). Based on
a blood alcohol concentration reading taken several hours after the fatal assault,
a government medical officer estimated that the accused’s blood alcohol con-
centration was between 0.255 and 0.273 at the time of the offense. The court
summarized the expert’s evidence as follows:
The doctor gave evidence that a person with a blood alcohol percentage
between 0.2 and 0.3 might be drowsy or lose consciousness, not understand
very well what was said, have impaired sensations about what was happening,
19. In one non-driving case, a police officer gave evidence of his ‘‘estimate’’ of the
accused’s blood alcohol concentration (0.15), based on observed behavior; R v. Kay [2012]
QCA 327, { 7. Elsewhere, the authors (with others) have discussed the research literature on
the difficulty of assessing blood alcohol concentration in this way; Quilter et al., supra note
3, at 937–38.
20. R v. Martin [2011] QCA 342.
21. Id. at {{ 6, 7, 10, 15, 35, 47, 50, 57, 58, 63, 65.
22. R v. Mitchell [2013] QCA 248.
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have impaired memory or gaps in memory, have slurred speech, loss of
balance, clumsiness, slow response times, and behave and speak inap-
propriately. The doctor found it difficult to comment about the effect of
mixing alcohol and cannabis, but observed that people could perhaps
behave in an irrational, aggressive, or even psychotic fashion. He agreed
that there was research to suggest that alcohol in the blood might lead to
a faster absorption of the active ingredient in cannabis, resulting in a more
rapid effect. Drinking methylated spirits and smoking cannabis together
could combine to produce a much greater effect than either would have
individually.23
As this case illustrates, additional challenges are raised by cases which
require assessment of the intoxication of a person who has consumed
a combination of different drugs. Abdel-Hady v. R24 was a case that featured
expert evidence on the individual and combined effects of multiple drugs:
alcohol, cocaine, and zolpidem (Stilnox).25 The atypical level of substance-
specific detail may be explained by the fact that the case involved the
relatively rare charge of causing another person to take an intoxicating
substance with intent to commit an indictable offense,26 thus requiring the
Crown to prove, inter alia, that the drugs in question constituted an intoxi-
cating substance. In any event, this isolated example served to highlight the
frequent absence of equivalent detail in many of the cases reviewed, partic-
ularly in relation to drugs other than alcohol. The implications of this
asymmetry will be considered further below, in the context of a discussion
of the tendency of Australian courts to ultimately approach intoxication as
a matter of ‘‘common knowledge.’’
Experts are rarely in a position to opine on the intoxication of the
accused personally because, when such assessments are based on inter-
view(s) with the accused (typically in a context where the case raises mental
illness and/or cognitive impairment issues, in addition to intoxication), the
interviews take place some considerable time after the alleged commission
of the offense.27
23. Id. at { 9. See also R v. Humbles [2014] SASCFC 91; R v. Civic [2014] QCA 322; R v.
Stanley [2013] NSW CCA 124.
24. Abdel-Hady v. R [2011] NSWCCA 196.
25. Id. at {{ 42–46, 50–56.
26. Crimes Act 1900 (NSW) s 38.
27. Expert evidence on the effects of alcohol and other drugs, including implications for
the offender’s level of culpability, was more frequently present in the sentencing appeal cases
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In a rare exception—the case of R v. Lakin28—a psychiatrist engaged
primarily to give evidence on the relevance of the accused’s post-traumatic
stress disorder, made an assessment of the accused’s intoxication on the
basis, inter alia, of having viewed a video of the arrest of Lakin:
Dr Raeside further concluded that, objectively, the video of the defendant’s
arrest did not provide evidence of marked intoxication, that the defendant’s
reported memory of events was inconsistent with marked intoxication, but
that the toxicology sample suggested at least a moderate intoxication,
which, he opines, would presumably have been higher at the time of the
offending.29
Expert evidence on alcohol and other drug effects was most common where
the case required the court to consider the relative contribution of (and to
disentangle) intoxication and mental illness and/or cognitive impair-
ment.30 The judicial treatment of expert evidence on intoxication will be
discussed further below, in relation to the question of its relevance to the
Crown’s ability to prove beyond reasonable doubt that the accused had the
requisite mens rea.
Another key finding of the review of cases undertaken for this study was
that imprecision was a feature of many of the descriptions and assessments
of intoxication. In addition to self-description and self-assessment regularly
being the only basis for assessments of offender and/or victim intoxica-
tion,31 the very nature of self-assessment lends itself to imprecision.
Table 1 summarizes and illustrates the variety of forms that self-
assessment took. It shows that the cases featured quantitative and qualita-
tive estimates of the volume consumed, the duration over which consump-
tion occurred, a ‘‘score’’ on a 1–10 scale of intoxication, or an adjectival or
colloquial account of the extent of the person’s intoxication. A number of
these approaches appear to represent an attempt to translate subjective
qualitative accounts into ostensibly ‘‘objective’’ quantitative measures. An
in this study’s dataset, especially where a pre-sentence report related the intoxication to
mental illness and/or cognitive impairment; see, e.g., Carpenter v. R [2013] NSWCCA 130; R
v Van Setten [2012] SASCFC 90; and further, McNamara et al., supra note 8, at 174–84.
28. R v. Lakin (2014) 118 SASR 535.
29. Id. at { 53.
30. For example, id. and R v. Clough [2010] QCA 120. This pattern was also apparent in
sentencing decisions in this study’s dataset: McNamara et al., supra note 8, at 179–81.
31. Reliance on self-report was especially common in sexual assault cases in relation to
evidence of victim intoxication; McNamara et al., supra note 8, 167–68.
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‘‘She had drunk three cans of
a vodka energy drink, a Midori and
a ‘Cowboy shot’ . . . ’’
Sharma v. R [2011]
VSCA 356, { 5
‘‘She had consumed two casks of
white wine and a dozen vodka
cruisers’’
R v. Frank [2010]
QCA 150, { 11
‘‘ . . . he said he had drunk
‘probably half a bottle’ of Jim Beam
before taking the bus to the city,
but that the bottle was ‘not a huge
one’. He said later that night he
drank ‘a box’ of beer over two and
a half hours.’’
DBW (a child) v. W.
Austl. [2011]
WASCA 206, { 30
Volume of alcohol
consumed—qualitative
‘‘Ms Sambo agreed she had been
drinking a lot on the day of the
killing’’
R v. Harold [2010]
QCA 267, { 12
‘‘As to her state of intoxication, MS
gave evidence that she had been





‘‘The complainant had drunk heavily
during the day and evening’’
R v. Butler [2011]
QCA 265, { 4
Time period during which
alcohol was consumed
‘‘She had drunk two or three cans
of pre-mixed bourbon every hour
from midnight until 4 am’’
R v. Quinlan [2012]
QCA 132, { 4
‘‘They had spent the afternoon at
the local tavern and both were
intoxicated.’’
Munda v. W. Austl.
(2013) 249 CLR
600, { 81
‘‘She had been drinking
(champagne) for many hours’’
Singh v. W. Austl.
[2012] WASCA 262,
{ 10
Measurement out of 10 ‘‘The appellant described himself
as ‘pissed’ when he arrived . . .
assessing his level of intoxication
as eight and a half or nine out
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appearance of accuracy and validity is thus created, but the scientific basis
for the claim is unclear. For example, how is a jury to receive and interpret
an accused’s self-report that he had consumed ‘‘6 Cougars, 2 Coronas and 3
Jim Beams,’’ noting as the Queensland Court of Appeal did in that case,
that ‘‘there was no evidence of the strength of the drinks, the period over
which he drank them or their effect on his sobriety’’?32 Apart from pro-
viding a crude indicator of the volume of alcohol consumed,33 it is not clear
how such ‘‘quantified’’ evidence assists jurors to make decisions in relation





‘‘When asked to describe how
intoxicated she was out of 10, she
replied ‘nine’ . . . ’’
Cook v. W. Austl.
[2010] WASCA
241, { 23
‘‘She said at this stage she was
still ‘very drunk’ and on a scale of
one to ten she estimated she was
at about eight to nine’’
Jones v. R [2010]
NSWCCA 117, { 16
Descriptive/adjectival ‘‘She said that she did not feel
drunk but was ‘a bit tipsy, a bit
happy’ and not completely drunk’’
Sharma v. R [2011]
VSCA 356, { 18
‘‘Just cruising, just out of it,
whacked, you know.’’
Sullivan v. R (2012)
221 A Crim R 490,
{ 10
‘‘He was heavily intoxicated to the
extent that he claimed to have
blacked out repeatedly . . . ’’
R v. Derks [2011]
QCA 295, { 21
32. R v. Barden [2010] QCA 374, { 50.
33. If the bourbon drinks consumed by Mr. Barden were of the pre-mixed can variety,
his consumption added up to approximately 15 standard alcoholic drinks (10 grams of
alcohol), according to Australian Government guidelines; Austl. Gov’t, Dep’t of Health,
Standard Drinks Guide, ALCOHOL.GOV.AU, http://www.alcohol.gov.au/internet/alcohol/
publishing.nsf/content/drinksguide-cnt#spirits. In the United States, a standard drink is
14 grams of alcohol; National Institute on Alcohol Abuse and Alcoholism, What is a Stan-
dard Drink?, NIAAA.NIH.GOV, http://www.niaaa.nih.gov/alcohol-health/overview-alcohol-
consumption/what-standard-drink.
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Counting drinks is not the only form of quantification employed in
criminal cases where intoxication is in issue. The trial practice of asking
a witness to self-assess their intoxication on a 1–10 numerical rating scale
(NRS) is common practice in Australian criminal courts (see examples in
Table 1). Although NRSs are widely regarded as valid as a self-report
mechanism for assessing pain,34 their use for the self-assessment of intox-
ication levels is more contentious, particularly for criminal law purposes.
Although there is evidence of NRSs having some utility in assessing generic
degrees of intoxication,35 such scales are insensitive to the wide spectrum of
alcohol and other drug effects covered by the term ‘‘intoxicated.’’ The
World Health Organization’s ICD-1036 recognizes that intoxication is not
a single-symptom condition and that the ‘‘signs’’ and ‘‘dysfunctional behav-
ior’’ upon which a diagnosis may be based can include, variously, ‘‘distur-
bances in the level of consciousness, cognition, perception, affect, or
behavior that are of clinical importance.’’37 It follows that NRSs are likely
to be an unhelpful guide to the nuanced, discrete intoxication-related issues
on which a criminal court may be required to adjudicate—such as whether
a witness’s testimony is reliable, whether a complainant in a sexual assault
case consented, or whether the accused acted with the requisite mens rea.
Another form of ‘‘lay’’ assessment that featured in a small number of
cases was witness assessment of the relevant person’s apparent intoxication.
These too were commonly characterized by imprecision. For example, in R
v. Mitchell 38 a witness described the accused, who had consumed alcohol
and cannabis, as ‘‘‘well off his head’, not paralytic ‘all that much’, and
‘really drunk . . . paralytic . . . could hardly stand up’.’’39
34. Mark P. Jensen & Paul Karoly, Self-Report Scales and Procedures for Assessing Pain in
Adults, in HANDBOOK OF PAIN ASSESSMENT 19, 26 (Dennis C. Turk & Ronald Melzack
eds., 3rd ed. 2010).
35. Sarah Callinan, Alcohol’s harm to others: Quantifying a little or a lot of harm, 3(2) INT’L
J. ALCOHOL & DRUG RES. 127 (2014); Elizabeth Manton, Sarah MacLean, Anne-Marie
Laslett, & Robin Room, Alcohol’s harm to others: Using qualitative research to complement
survey findings, 3(2) INT’L J. OF ALCOHOL AND DRUG RES. 143 (2014).
36. WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION, THE ICD-10 CLASSIFICATION OF MENTAL AND
BEHAVIOURAL DISORDERS: DIAGNOSTIC CRITERIA FOR RESEARCH F10–F19 (1993) (Mental
and behavioral disorders due to psychoactive substance use).
37. Id. at F1x.0 Intoxication, G2.
38. R v. Mitchell [2013] QCA 248.
39. Id. at { 3.
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Perhaps inevitably, cases in which offender self-report was the only
evidence of intoxication prompted judicial doubt about veracity. For exam-
ple, in the case of Liu v. WA40 there was evidence that a bottle of whiskey
had been consumed by a group of three people (including the victim and
the two accused). The court observed:
However there was no evidence:
(a) about what portion of the bottle Ms Liu drank;
(b) about the volume of the bottle of whiskey;
(c) about the period of time the alcohol was consumed; or
(d) that Ms Liu was affected by the alcohol she consumed.41
In another case in which the accused asserted that he was intoxicated as
a result of marijuana consumption, the trial judge expressed concern that
there was no pharmacological evidence at trial about the effects of mari-
juana and that the jury was being asked to speculate.42 The accused relied
heavily on self-report about how much he had consumed and how he
felt—‘‘stoned, whacked, out of it’’43—and there was ‘‘ . . . no evidence of
intoxication [] save the evidence of the applicant at trial.’’44 In these cir-
cumstances the New South Wales Court of Criminal Appeal found no fault
with the trial judge’s decision to decline to leave intoxication to the jury as
relevant to mens rea.
The observation that imprecision was common in the cases reviewed is not
based only on the prevalence of different modes of self-assessment. ‘‘Author-
itative’’ voices in the justice system—police officers, trial judges, appeal
courts—frequently articulated their assessments that a person was (or was
not) intoxicated in vague language. Illustrative examples of judicial language,
showing the major categories of terms used, are provided in Table 2.
The cases reveal surprisingly little meaningful articulation of what the
term ‘‘intoxication’’ means.45 The value of the judicial adoption of
40. Liu v. W. Austl. [2012] WASCA 218.
41. Id. at { 34.
42. Sullivan v. R [2011] NSWCCA 270, { 12.
43. Id. at { 19.
44. Id. at { 34.
45. This finding is reminiscent of the phase of this study that considered statutory
language on intoxication, which identified more than 50 different word/phrase formula-
tions, many of which lack precision and utility demarcating ‘‘intoxication’’ for criminal law
purposes; Quilter et al., supra note 3, at 923.
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Table 2. Illustrations of Judicial Language on ‘‘Intoxication’’
‘‘Affected
by’’
‘‘He was, I am satisfied, affected by
alcohol’’
Stewart v. R [2012]
NSWCCA 183, { 21
‘‘GM was significantly affected by
alcohol’’
Mulkatana & Mulkatana v. R
[2010] 28 NTLR 31, { 54
‘‘Intoxicated’’ ‘‘At the time of the killing, he was
intoxicated by alcohol and cannabis.’’
Munda v. W. Austl. (2013)
249 CLR 600, { 82
‘‘Had consumed a considerable amount
of alcohol during the evening and she
was extremely intoxicated’’
Singh v. W. Austl. [2012]
WASCA 262, { 25
‘‘She became very intoxicated’’ Victor v. W. Austl. [2011]
WASCA 94, { 4
‘‘The trial judge found that the
respondent was very intoxicated when
the events in question occurred’’
W. Austl. v. Camus [2014]
WASCA 74, { 105
‘‘marked intoxication’’ R v. Lakin (2014) 118
SASR 535, { 54
‘‘She was significantly intoxicated’’ Ali v. R [2014] NSWCCA
45, {{ 8, 31
‘‘Under the
influence’’
‘‘Was very substantially impaired by the
fact that he was under the influence by
a combination of drugs (they being
alcohol and cannabis)’’
R v. Millwood [2012]
NSWCCA 2, { 2
‘‘You told the police you thought it was
likely you were under the influence of
alcohol or drugs at the time of your
actions.’’
P v. Tas. [2014] TASCCA
5, { 21
‘‘He also became aware fairly quickly
after entering the house that the
appellant was under the influence of
liquor to some degree’’
R v. Martin [2011] QCA
342, { 14
Other ‘‘The judge noted that both appellants
were intoxicated and his Honour inferred
that both were addled by alcohol.’’
Gosland & McDonald v. R
[2013] VSCA 269, { 6
The defendant ‘‘had taken a good deal
of liquor’’
R v. Lutze (2014) 121
SASR 144, { 30
‘‘[The victim’s evidence] is vague and
imprecise in significant aspects,
probably as a result of her
befuddlement from drink’’
Amato v. DPP [2013]
VSCA 346, { 46
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qualifying terms like ‘‘very,’’ ‘‘extremely,’’ or ‘‘significantly’’ (see Table 2) is
questionable. The same may be said of familiar clichés like ‘‘affected by’’
and ‘‘under the influence.’’ Like the crude forms of quantification on which
comment has already been made, such language seems ill-adapted to the
discrete inquiries required by criminal trials. Curiously, such language was
sometimes used to ‘‘translate’’ a blood alcohol concentration reading or
estimate, presumably on the basis that this would assist the tribunal of fact
to make sense of the scientific evidence. For example, in R v. Chenery,46 the
Queensland Court of Appeal Court adopted the language employed at trial
by experts to describe the victim as ‘‘moderately intoxicated’’ (blood alcohol
concentration 0.184) and the accused as suffering from ‘‘gross intoxication’’
(estimated blood alcohol concentration 0.267), without any explanation of
what the qualifiers ‘‘moderately’’ and ‘‘gross’’ mean.47 The significance of
an apparent preference for lay colloquial descriptions of intoxication over
expert scientific nomenclature is considered later in this article.
Even in the rare case where the court actively considered the meaning of
‘‘intoxication,’’ reliance was placed on ordinary meanings found in dictio-
naries. In the case of R v. Clough,48 which involved amphetamine intoxi-
cation, in a context where the accused asserted that he was not intoxicated
at the relevant time (a pre-condition to gaining access to the defense of
insanity under Section 27 of the Criminal Code (Qld)49), the trial judge
and the Court of Appeal discussed at length the ordinary meaning of
‘‘intoxicated.’’ Muir JA said:
I respectfully agree with the primary judge’s conclusions that the ordinary
meaning of ‘‘intoxication’’ is wide enough to encompass more than com-
paratively short-term elation or stimulation and that ‘‘intoxication’’
. . . includes the secondary effect of amphetamine consumption from which
the appellant was suffering at relevant times. The primary judge referred to
the Macquarie Dictionary definition of ‘‘intoxication’’, which included:
46. R v. Chenery [2011] QCA 271.
47. Id. at { 6.
48. R v. Clough [2010] QCA 120.
49. See Criminal Code (Qld) s 28(2): ‘‘[The provisions of s 27] . . . do not apply to the case
of a person who has, to any extent intentionally caused himself or herself to become in-
toxicated or stupefied, whether in order to afford excuse for the commission of an offence or
not and whether his or her mind is disordered by the intoxication alone or in combination
with some other agent.’’
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1. inebriation, drunkenness.
2. Pathol. Poisoning
3. the act of intoxicating.
4. overpowering action or effect upon the mind
and the Shorter Oxford Dictionary definition, which included:
1. the action of poisoning; (an instance of) the state of being
poisoned . . .
2. The action of inebriating or making someone stupid,
insensible or disordered in intellect, with a drug or alco-
holic liquor; the condition of being so stupefied or disordered
. . . fig The action or power of exhilarating or highly exciting
the mind; the elation or excitement beyond the bounds of
sobriety.50
Ironically, despite the efforts of the Court to engage in a meaningful
discussion of the definition of ‘‘intoxication,’’ the discussion does little to
illuminate the meaning of the concept for criminal law purposes. The
bolded passages in the above quote are presumably regarded as offering
the greatest guidance, and yet consider the language in which they repre-
sent the concept of intoxication: ‘‘stupid,’’ ‘‘insensible,’’ ‘‘disordered in
intellect,’’ ‘‘overpowering action.’’ When these phrases are added to the
language used by judges (see Table 2) and witnesses (Table 1), discussed
earlier, a pattern can be discerned. The prevailing modes of explaining and
evidencing intoxication in Australian criminal cases are characterized by
imprecision and a reliance on vernacular expressions.
In one of the most bizarre (and inappropriate) metaphorical attempts
to make a person’s degree of intoxication comprehensible to a jury (in this
case, the intoxication of the victim who fell from the tray of a ute [a
pickup truck] being driven by the accused, and was killed), the trial judge
in R v. Carberry,51 said, ‘‘That is the reason you do not drive around in
the ute with a six-year-old boy, a retarded person, a dog or an intoxicated
person.’’52 On appeal the Full Court of the South Australian Supreme
Court observed that ‘‘[t]he evidence did not permit such emotive expres-
sions or analogies to be fairly used. They were unhelpful, liable to distract
50. R v. Clough [2010] QCA 120, { 14 (emphasis added).
51. R v. Carberry [2014] SASCFC 78.
52. Id. at { 6.
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and had the capacity to mislead.’’53 It is worth noting, however, that
the Court offered no further guidance on how the trial judge should
have explained the concept of intoxication and its relevance to the
matters in issue.
Overall, the cases reviewed in Part I reveal a pattern of courts frequently
being required to make complex decisions with evidence that often lacked
nuance and sophistication, and that was not obviously adapted to the tasks
at hand. These findings give rise to an important question: Under such
conditions, by what means is the available evidence and the opaque dis-
cursive construction of ‘‘intoxication’’ linked to criminal trial adjudication?
The next part of this article aims to draw on the study’s dataset to propose
an answer to this question.
I I . THE INTOX ICAT ION -CR IM INAL RESPONS IB I L I TY
RELAT IONSH IP
To illuminate how the apparent gaps between the available intoxication
evidence and the key issue(s) for adjudication in a criminal trial are filled,
the authors undertook a case study of a subset of judgments. The case study
subsample consisted of all cases in the dataset in which intoxication was an
issue in relation to the accused’s criminal responsibility (n ¼ 66 cases; 20%
of the total dataset). The primary aim is to show how the deficits that were
described in Part I of this article are remedied in practice. The case study
included, but was not limited to, cases in which the so-called intoxication
defense was an issue. Indeed, one of the motivations for choosing to focus
on cases in the project dataset where the relationship between the accused’s
(asserted) intoxication and criminal responsibility was adjudicated upon,54
is to counteract the common tendency to use the term ‘‘intoxication
53. Id. at { 40.
54. Elsewhere the authors have shown that, despite its obvious importance, questions
about the accused’s mens rea and criminal responsibility are just one of the ways in which
intoxication evidence may be of significance in a criminal case. For example, of the 327 cases
in the study’s appellate decisions dataset, 40% addressed the relevance of the accused’s
intoxication to sentencing, and 9% addressed the relevance of the victim’s intoxication to
her/his credibility and reliability as a witness (primarily in sexual assault cases). The multiple
purposes for which Australian criminal laws and trials attach significance to intoxication are
discussed more fully in Quilter et al., supra note 3, at 918–20; and McNamara et al., supra
note 8, at 153.
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defense’’ loosely, and in a way that masks the multiple ways in which
intoxication can be implicated in the assessment of criminal responsibility.
Because of the ubiquity of the term, the complexity of the relationship
between intoxication evidence and determinations of criminal responsibil-
ity is often underappreciated. In fact, the defense strategy of relying on
intoxication to negate the Crown’s capacity to prove the elements of the
crime charged is only one of the ways in which intoxication evidence can
influence the course and outcome of a criminal trial—and it is a risky
strategy even then.55 In addition to marginalizing all the other important
ways in which intoxication is involved in criminal law enforcement and
decision making, the terminology ‘‘intoxication defense’’ has always been
something of a misnomer. Intoxication may be implicated in the determi-
nation of criminal responsibility in a range of ways.56 It may be:
 asserted by a defendant for an exculpatory purpose—most com-
monly, to negate the Crown’s capacity to prove specific intent (not-
ing that, even if successful, this strategy is likely to result in
conviction for a lesser crime, rather than acquittal);57
 asserted by a defendant to support the subjective test component
of another defense, such as provocation,58 self-defense,59 or
mistake of fact;60
 the subject of a judge’s direction to the jury, even if not asserted by the
defendant, reflecting the trial judge’s obligation to put intoxication
55. See McNamara et al., supra note 8, at 169–74.
56. For a fuller discussion, see id.
57. All Australian jurisdictions, with the exception of Victoria, have adopted the position
that intoxication may only be raised to negative specific intent—i.e., an element of an offense
definition where the prosecution must prove an intention to bring about a particular
consequence—and not general (or basic) intent. The distinction was endorsed by the House
of Lords in DPP v. Majewski [1977] AC 443 (U.K.), and although it was rejected by the
High Court of Australia in R v. O’Connor (1980) 146 CLR 64, legislatures have modified the
Australian common law position. The veracity of the general intent/specific intent dis-
tinction as an appropriate basis for determining the availability of exculpatory intoxication
evidence has been questioned; see, e.g., TASMANIAN L. REFORM INSTITUTE, INTOXICATION
AND CRIMINAL RESPONSIBILITY (FINAL REPORT NO. 7), 46 (Aug. 2006); William Roth,
General vs. Specific Intent: A Time for Terminological Understanding in California, 7 PEP-
PERDINE L. REV. 67 (1979).
58. For example, R v. Lindsay [2014] SASCFC 56.
59. For example, Dal Cortivo v. R [2010] ACTCA 14.
60. For example. Commissioner of Police v. Stehbens [2013] QCA 81; Prazmo v. W.
Austl. (No 2) [2010] WASCA 99.
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evidence to the jury if there is sufficient evidence that it may be
relevant to a matter that goes to the guilty/not guilty decision;61
 counterintuitively, asserted by the Crown to strengthen (not
weaken) the prosecution’s assertion that the defendant acted with
the requisite intent;62 and
 asserted by the Crown to foreclose access to a defense (noting that
legislation defining some defenses expressly excludes reliance on
intoxication evidence63).64
The dataset did contain a small number of cases in which the trial judge
was found to have erred in his/her explanation of the law on intoxication’s
relevance to the question of the accused’s guilt.65 However, overall, there was
little evidence that this is an area of the criminal law in Australia where the
rules are so complex66 that judges are frequently falling into legal error.67
The application of the rules, however, is another matter—though, it is
61. For example, SW v. R [2013] NSWCCA 103; R v. George [2013] QCA 267; R v.
Barden [2010] QCA 374; Mulkatana & Mulkatana v. The Queen [2010] NTCCA 4.
62. For example, in Ward v. R [2013] NSWCCA 46, { 82, the trial judge directed the jury:
‘‘You can have an intoxicated intention. You can have an intention that is based on alcohol and
drugs. In fact, very often, unfortunately, the situation is that a person forms a certain intention
because they are intoxicated and they would no [sic] not have formed it if they were not.’’ See also
R v. Barden [2010] QCA 374; Mulkatana & Mulkatana v. The Queen [2010] NTCCA.
63. For example, the defense of insanity in s 27 of the Criminal Code 1913 (WA) and the
Criminal Code 1899 (Qld), the partial defense of extreme provocation in s 23 of the Crimes
Act 1900 (NSW), and the partial defense of diminished responsibility in s 159(3) of the
Criminal Code 1983 (NT).
64. Babic v. R [2010] VSCA 198; MG v. R [2010] VSCA 97, { 16; R v. Stanley [2013]
NSWCCA 46; R v. Humbles [2014] SASCFC 91.
65. R v. O’Loughlin [2011] QCA 123; R v. George [2013] QCA 267; R v. Douglas [2014]
QCA 187; R v. Lindsay [2014] SASCFC 56; Dal Cortivo v. R [2010] ACTCA 14.
66. Unlike, for example, the law of common law complicity; NSW L. REF. COMMIS-
SION, COMPLICITY (REPORT NO. 129) (2010). Alleviating complexity was one of the major
objectives of the recent codification of complicity law in Victoria (Crimes Act 1958, ss 323–
324C) in response to J.A. WEINBERG, JUDICIAL COLLEGE OF VICTORIA AND DEPARTMENT
OF JUSTICE, SIMPLIFICATION OF JURY DIRECTIONS PROJECT (REPORT TO THE JURY DI-
RECTIONS ADVISORY GROUP) ch 2 (2012).
67. Suggested/standard directions contained in Benchbooks are widely used: see, e.g., R v.
Handley [2011] QCA 361; Queensland Courts, Supreme and District Courts Benchbooks, PART
L84 ‘‘INTENTIONAL INTOXICATION,’’ http://www.courts.qld.gov.au/__data/assets/pdf_file/
0005/86090/sd-bb-84-intentional-intoxication.pdf; McDonald v. R [2010] NSWCCA 220;
Judicial Commission of NSW, Criminal Trial Courts Benchbook, PART [3-250] ‘‘INTOXICA-
TION,’’ http://www.judcom.nsw.gov.au/publications/benchbks/criminal/intoxication.html.
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noteworthy that the complexity of the task faced by the tribunal of fact in
a case where intoxication evidence features was rarely acknowledged by
appellate courts in the judgments examined.
Staying with the instance in which the accused’s intoxication is said to
be relevant to mens rea, juries (or in judge-alone trials, judges and magis-
trates) are routinely asked to answer two very difficult related questions—
often, as noted above, with limited evidence and guidance. First, what was
the degree or extent of the accused’s intoxication? Second, taking that level
of intoxication into account, has the Crown established that the accused
had the requisite mens rea?
The deceptive ease with which these questions can be put to the jury is
illustrated by the case of R v. Baker, where the trial judge made it clear that
the level and effects of a person’s intoxication are matters for the jury:
Similarly, for the purposes of this particular section, intent to cause
grievous bodily harm is a specific intent and so the considerations that I
explained to you before about intoxication are equally appropriate. If you,
having considered the evidence, if you accept that there was some degree of
intoxication, the extent and the nature of that intoxication, ladies and
gentlemen, is a matter for you to determine. If there was any intoxication,
that’s a matter for you, but whether and to what extent that intoxication
impacted on his capacity to have the necessary intention is a matter that’s
relevant to consider.68
It is questionable whether there is adequate appreciation of just how
challenging such inquiries are. The case of R v. Stanley69 is illustrative.
The accused, who was recognized to have been ‘‘grossly intoxicated,’’70
was charged, inter alia, with assault with intention to have sexual inter-
course.71 On the facts and the manner in which the indictment was
framed, the Crown was required to prove that the accused had the specific
intent to put his penis in the victim’s mouth. The New South Wales
Court of Criminal Appeal described this central question for the jury as
‘‘a simple one, of a kind routinely answered by juries.’’72
68. R v. Baker [2014] QCA 5, { 82.
69. R v. Stanley [2013] NSWCCA 124.
70. Id. at { 6].
71. Crimes Act 1900 (NSW) s 61 K.
72. R v. Stanley [2013] NSWCA 124, { 56.
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Even if this is true of proving intent generally,73 is it really accurate
where the jury, inter alia, has to decide how the accused’s intoxication
influenced whether he formed the requisite intent?74 Furthermore, on
what knowledge are juries expected to draw in answering these questions?
The trial judge’s direction in R v. Stott,75 with which the Full Court of
the Supreme Court of South Australia found no fault, provides a further
illustration of the sorts of complex inquiries about the state of mind of an
intoxicated person, in which juries are expected to engage. The defendant
was charged with multiple offenses, including aggravated creating risk of
harm and aggravated endangering life, after driving a car at police officers
who were pursuing him on foot and endeavoring to apprehend him.76
The trial judge said:
The inferences about intention and recklessness which may be drawn in the
case of a sober person from his actions may not be as readily drawn in the
case of an intoxicated person. I am sure you all know that alcohol can dull
our senses. It can cloud or confuse our perceptions of our surroundings and
the behaviour of other people. So when you are considering with what
intention or state of mind the accused acted, you will bear in mind the effect,
if any, of the influence of alcohol upon his mind. As I have mentioned, you
will bear in mind intoxication when considering both intention and reck-
lessness. I remind you that he will have been reckless in causing harm,
endangering life or causing serious harm if he was aware that there was
a substantial risk that his driving could result in harm or putting life in
endanger [sic] or causing serious harm, and he went ahead and drove the way
he did, despite the risk and without adequate justification.77
This quotation brings into focus the questions that were posed at the
beginning of Part II of this article. What sorts of knowledge and what sorts
of ‘‘expertise’’ do the work of defining and proving intoxication, and ex-
plaining its effects on the intoxicated person? The answer, the authors
assert, is ‘‘common knowledge.’’
73. See JEREMY GANS, MODERN CRIMINAL LAW OF AUSTRALIA 76 (2012); Nicola Lacey,
A Clear Concept of Intention: Elusive or Illusory?, 56(5) MOD. L. REV. 621 (1993); Iannella v.
French (1968) 119 CLR 84, 95 (Barwick CJ).
74. See, e.g., McDonald v. R [2010] NSWCCA 220.
75. R v. Stott [2011] SASFC 145.
76. Id. at { 5.
77. Id. at { 20.
190 | NEW CRIMINAL LAW REVIEW | VOL . 21 | NO . 1 | W INTER 2018
A. ‘‘Common Knowledge’’ of Intoxication
Mariana Valverde has described a ‘‘curious form of knowledge that appears
to exist only in legal contexts: ‘common knowledge’.’’78 She has explained,
‘‘Common knowledge is not some kind of average of what people know. It
is not descriptive but imperative; it is the knowledge we all ought to
have.’’79 One of the case studies employed by Valverde to amplify her
analysis of the part that common knowledge plays in legal decision making
is the operation of legal regimes for liquor licensing in Canada, specifically
in relation to the assessment of whether a person is ‘‘drunk.’’80 Most
relevantly for present purposes, Valverde found that ‘‘knowledges of
alcohol and of alcohol’s effects on human bodies are regarded as lay rather
than expert knowledges.’’81
Loughnan has examined the 19th and 20th century history of the com-
mon law concept of ‘‘intoxication’’ in the context of her broader study of
mental incapacity in criminal law82 and advances a thesis similar to Val-
verde’s. Although the specific focus of the following observations was the
legal concept of ‘‘insanity,’’ they apply equally to the concept of intoxication:
Lay knowledge, which is a form of collective knowledge, is a broad and
flexible construct, capturing the socially ratified attitudes and beliefs . . . held
by non-specialists. . . . Lay knowledge encompasses experiential or firsthand
knowledge (of alcohol, or mental illness, for instance), but extends beyond
this empirical base to include social attitudes . . . 83
Both Loughnan and Valverde make the important point that lay knowledge
is not synonymous with lay adjudication. Lay knowledge is not only em-
ployed by jurors, but also ‘‘informs the decision-making of legal actors—
including judges, magistrates, prosecution, and defense counsel.’’84 When
78. VALVERDE, supra note 10, at 224. See also CLIFFORD GEERTZ, LOCAL KNOWLEDGE,
Ch. 4. Common Sense as a Cultural System (1983).
79. VALVERDE, supra note 10, at 224.
80. Id. at Chs. 6 & 7.
81. Id. at 190.
82. LOUGHNAN, supra note 11, esp. Ch. 7.
83. LOUGHNAN, supra note 11, at 47–48. See also Nicola Lacey, Responsibility and
Modernity in Criminal Law, 9(3) J. POL. PHIL. 249 (2001); Arlie Loughnan, The Expertise of
Non-Experts: Knowledges of Intoxication in Criminal Law, in INTOXICATION AND SOCIETY:
PROBLEMATIC PLEASURES OF DRUGS AND ALCOHOL (Jonathon Herring et al. eds., 2013).
84. LOUGHNAN, supra note 11, at 196.
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judges use common knowledge on intoxication, ‘‘that common knowl-
edge becomes part of the judge’s storehouse of what Bourdieu calls pro-
fessional legal capital.’’85
There was strong evidence that common/lay knowledge about alcohol
effects is a powerful ingredient in contemporary Australian judicial decision
making about the relevance of intoxication to criminal responsibility. Part III
of this article will argue that the concept (or ‘‘entity’’86) of intoxication that is
operative in criminal trials is a legal concept that is produced by and con-
trolled by lawyers and judges rather than scientific, medical, or psychological
experts. This fact, combined with its lay knowledge foundations, explains the
mixture of considerations that constitute the concept—in Valverde’s terms,
‘‘a loosely put together entity composed of a number of somewhat arbitrarily
chosen ‘facts’’’87—including (adverse) moral judgments about alcohol and
drug consumption and intoxication.88 One of the effects of the dominance
of lay knowledge of intoxication is that ‘‘it functions to forestall certain
arguments about what is known and not known about intoxication.’’89
The cases reviewed suggest that arbiters of fact in Australian criminal
courts are regularly required to draw on common knowledge to fill the
deficit when it comes to the meaning of the concept of intoxication, and
the effects of alcohol (and other drugs). A typical deployment of ‘‘common
knowledge,’’ in Valverde’s terms, is when jurors are effectively ‘‘reminded’’
about something they are expected (indeed, required) to know, as the
following examples from our case study demonstrate:
I am sure you all know that alcohol can dull our senses. It can cloud or confuse
our perceptions of our surroundings and the behaviour of other people.90
85. VALVERDE, supra note 10, at 171; see Pierre Bourdieu, The Force of Law: Toward
a Sociology of the Juridical Field, 38 HASTINGS L.J. 805 (1987).
86. Loughnan has described the late 19th century and 20th century development of
a ‘‘distinct legal entity of intoxication’’; LOUGHNAN, supra note 11, at 174.
87. VALVERDE, supra note 10, at 187.
88. Id. at 198–201; see also MARIANA VALVERDE, DISEASES OF THE WILL: ALCOHOL AND
THE DILEMMAS OF FREEDOM 51 (1998) (drunkenness as a ‘‘hybrid’’—‘‘part vice, part dis-
ease’’). McCord has described U.S. criminal laws on intoxication as reflecting ‘‘a rule of law
that is based on a curious mixture of, on the one hand, moral sentiment, and on the other,
unexamined factual assumptions regarding the effects of alcohol on human mental func-
tioning’’; David McCord, The English and American history of voluntary intoxication to negate
Mens Rea, 11(3) J. LEGAL HIST. 372, 389 (1990).
89. LOUGHNAN, supra note 11, at 186.
90. R v. Stott [2011] SASFC 145, { 20.
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It is in accordance with ordinary human experience that a well intoxi-
cated person may retain capacity and ability to think and act, albeit with
limitations.91
Such matters [i.e., understanding the effects of alcohol and other drugs ‘‘on
the mind’’] may not be wholly unfamiliar to jurors. Some may know at first
hand some of the effects spoken about, at least of alcohol. Such jurors would
be able to judge from experience.92
In some instances, the judicially asserted ‘‘common knowledge’’ appeared
to stretch into scenarios that are, in fact, quite unlikely to be common, yet
jurors are rhetorically compelled to assume that this is so. Consider the
following trial judge direction and the analogy employed:
To give you an example of what may be a more common experience.
A person has too much to drink and whilst in an intoxicated state gets in the
car and drives home. The next day that person may have no recollection of
having driven the car. But it does not follow that because he does not recall
driving the car that it was not intentional. Whilst he may not have
remembered the driving the next day, at the time that he drove the car he
intended to drive it. Lack of recollection does not equate with loss of intent
or loss of ability to control your body.93
A further consequence of the trope of common knowledge is that con-
siderable latitude is left for the prosecution to bring into the category of
common knowledge ‘‘facts’’ about alcohol effects that may be adverse to the
accused. For example, in R v. Kay94 the defendant objected that it was
wrong of the Crown to assert at trial that alcohol made him aggressive,
when there was no evidence of such a causal relationship in his case.95
The Queensland Court of Appeal declined to characterize the Crown’s
submission in this way:
It is not clear that the criticism was maintained of the submission claimed to
have been implicitly made by the prosecutor, that there was evidence that
the appellant had a propensity to become aggressive when drunk. No such
submission was made. Defense counsel did not advert to any such
91. Shepherd v. R [2011] NSWCCA 245, { 192.
92. R v. Stanley [2013] NSWCCA 124, { 60.
93. Babic v. R [2010] VSCA 198, { 106.
94. R v. Kay [2012] QCA 327.
95. Id. at { 18.
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submission. The prosecutor was merely making some commonplace ob-
servations about the effects of alcohol on human behaviour.96
If reliance on ‘‘common knowledge’’ is problematic as a basis for adju-
dication in relation to alcohol intoxication, it is even more so in relation to
the ‘‘intoxicating’’ effects of other drugs. A significant part of the asserted
justification for the adequacy of lay knowledge as a touchstone for criminal
law assessments of intoxication, is that jurors are likely to have some form
of first-hand experience of the effects of alcohol consumption.97 Among
Australians aged 14 and above, 86 percent have consumed alcohol at least
once, and 37 percent drink at least weekly.98 However, the majority of
Australians have never used an illicit drug. Of those that have: 35 percent
have used cannabis; 11 percent have used ecstasy; 8 percent have used
cocaine; 7 percent have used meth/amphetamines; and 1 percent have used
heroin.99 Different drugs have different primary effects (including depres-
sant, stimulant, and hallucinogenic effects),100 including different effects
on executive cognitive function.101 The World Health Organization’s
ICD-10 emphasizes that an intoxication diagnosis must be based on ‘‘signs’’
and ‘‘dysfunctional behaviour’’ that that are ‘‘compatible with the known
actions of the particular substance (or substances).’’102
In these circumstances, if there is doubt about the validity of alcohol
intoxication assessments, there must be even greater doubt about whether
tribunals of fact are making sound assessments of the intoxication of an
accused person (or victim) in cases where other drugs have been consumed.
The case study also provides evidence to support the arguments
advanced by Valverde and Loughnan that common knowledge on
96. Id. at { 39.
97. VALVERDE, supra note 10, at 183.
98. AUSTRALIAN INSTITUTE OF HEALTH AND WELFARE, NATIONAL DRUG STRATEGY
HOUSEHOLD SURVEY: DETAILED REPORT 2013 (2014).
99. Id.
100. WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION, LEXICON OF ALCOHOL AND DRUG TERMS
(T. Babor, R. Campbell, R. Room, & J. Saunders eds., 1994).
101. Carl L. Hart et al., Is Cognitive Functioning Impaired in Methamphetamine Users? A
Critical Review, 37 NEUROPSYCHOPHARMACOLOGY 586 (2012); Antonio Verdejo-Garcia
et al., COMT val158met and 5-HTTLPR Genetic Polymorphisms Moderate Executive Control
in Cannabis Users, 38 NEUROPSYCHOPHARMACOLOGY 1598 (2013); Antonio Verdejo-Garcia
et al., Differential effects of MDMA, cocaine, and cannabis use severity on distinctive compo-
nents offer executive functions in polysubstance users, 30 ADDICTIVE BEHAVIOUR 89 (2005).
102. WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION, supra note 36, at F1x.0 Intoxication, G2.
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intoxication is not merely unmediated ‘‘common sense,’’ but rather, a set of
understandings that are validated and given ‘‘capital’’ by authoritative
voices, including police, lawyers, magistrates, and judges.103 Part III will
examine the techniques employed by judges to render the concept of
intoxication tangible and ‘‘visible’’ to juries, and argue that ‘‘tests’’ of intox-
ication based on a person’s mechanical functionality are an influential
component of the common knowledge of intoxication that circulates in
Australian criminal courts. Attention will be drawn to the marginalization
of expert evidence, and the appropriateness of judicially constructed ‘‘tests’’
of intoxication will be assessed.
I I I . THE DEPLOYMENT OF COMMON KNOWLEDGE
OF ‘ ‘ I NTOX ICAT ION ’ ’
Review of the cases in the sample for this study suggests that courts do not
necessarily attach great value to contemporary expertise from outside
the law on the effects of alcohol and other drugs—at least in relation
to the matters of primary relevance in a criminal trial (for example, did the
accused intend to cause serious harm?). Judges regularly assert authority
over the determinative concept of ‘‘intoxication.’’104 This finding echoes
Loughnan’s observation that the ‘‘low profile of expert evidence in cases
in which intoxication is pleaded’’ is consistent with the ascendency of lay
over expert knowledge when it comes to criminal court decision making
about intoxication.105
There is a parallel with the defense of ‘‘insanity’’/mental illness,106
another legal concept which listens to, but does not defer to, ‘‘non-legal’’
expertise.107 However, there is also a notable difference. Although it is
103. VALVERDE, supra note 10, at 171; LOUGHNAN, supra note 11, at 196.
104. Valverde has shown that resistance to the ‘‘medicalization’’ of intoxication has
a long history; VALVERDE, supra note 88, at 49–50; also LOUGHNAN, supra note 11, at 181.
105. LOUGHNAN, supra note 11, at 196.
106. Loughnan has traced the interconnected development of the legal concepts of
‘‘insanity’’ and ‘‘intoxication,’’ as well as other categories of mental incapacity; see, generally,
LOUGHNAN, supra note 11.
107. Both intoxication and insanity have been described as hybrid concepts; see, e.g.,
VALVERDE, supra note 88, at 51; Katey Thom & Mary Finlayson, ‘‘They’re Not Really Doing
‘Normal’ Psychiatry’’: The Socio-Legal Shaping of Psychiatric Expertise in Insanity Trials, 20(1)
PSYCHIATRY, PSYCHOL. & L. 46 (2013).
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controversial and the subject of criticism,108 there is a recognized legal
definition of the state of ‘‘insanity’’ that operates in the context of asses-
sing criminal responsibility.109 By contrast, there is no widely recognized
and judicially or legislatively authorized definition of ‘‘intoxication,’’110
and yet the concept is engaged on a regular basis in criminal justice
decision making.
Part I of this article observed that expert evidence on the effects of
alcohol (and other drugs) was sometimes (but not routinely) part of the
evidence in the cases reviewed. The discussion here focuses not on fre-
quency but on judicial attitudes to such expert testimony, and its relative
importance compared to what the jury is assumed to already know about
intoxication. A pattern identified across a number of cases is illustrated by
the case of R v. Stanley.111 This was a case in which the Crown appealed
against a decision that the trial be by judge alone.112 The appeal dealt with
a number of issues about the basis on which the decision was made. Having
upheld the appeal on other grounds, the New South Wales Court of
Criminal Appeal considered afresh whether a judge-alone trial was war-
ranted, and focused on the fact that the accused’s intoxication would be in
issue. One of the defendant’s grounds for requesting a judge-alone trial was
that a jury was neither appropriate nor necessary because the trial would
feature complex expert evidence on intoxication, and the charges113 were
such that this was not a case in which the trier of fact would be required to
apply ‘‘community standards’’ to decide whether he was guilty. The
Crown’s position was that a jury would be best placed to answer the
intoxication/specific intent question ‘‘from their own experience.’’114
The Court agreed that a jury was the ‘‘preferable tribunal of fact’’:115
108. See, e.g., NSW LAW REFORM COMMISSION, PEOPLE WITH COGNITIVE AND
MENTAL HEALTH IMPAIRMENTS IN THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM: CRIMINAL
RESPONSIBILITY AND CONSEQUENCES (REPORT NO. 138) (2013).
109. M’Naghten’s Case [1843–1860] All ER 229 (U.K.); R v. Porter (1933) 55 CLR 182
(Austl.). The law has been codified in modified form in several Australian jurisdictions; see,
e.g., Criminal Code 1913 (WA) s 27.
110. Quilter et al., supra note 3; McNamara et al., supra note 8.
111. R v. Stanley [2013] NSWCCA 124.
112. Pursuant to the Criminal Procedure Act 1986 (NSW) Pt. 3 Div. 2.
113. The accused was charged with intentional or reckless infliction of actual bodily harm
with intent to have sexual intercourse, indecent assault, and assault.
114. R v. Stanley [2013] NSWCCA 124, { 17.
115. Id. at { 61.
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I doubt whether the evidence of the pharmacological experts is likely to be
complex. As their reports stand, they agree. They may continue to agree. A
jury is not likely to have difficulty understanding opinions about the effects
of alcohol and the other drugs mentioned on the mind, particularly the
ability to form and the likelihood of the formation of intent. Such matters
may not be wholly unfamiliar to jurors. Some may know at first hand some
of the effects spoken about, at least of alcohol. Such jurors would be able to
judge from experience.116
Interestingly, the trial judge had expressed the view that the foreshadowed
evidence of the two experts on drug effects (about which they mainly agreed)
did not appear to have ‘‘any relevance to the question of specific intent’’117—
that is, the central issue to which their evidence was designed to relate.
This case was only the most blunt illustration of a wider pattern detected
during the case review: a judicially perceived gap between what experts can
tell us about alcohol and other drug effects on the one hand, and what the
criminal law needs to know and decide on the other. At the same time there
was considerable evidence of a willingness, on the part of some judges, in
their directions to juries and in appellate judgments, to offer their own
insights on what should be regarded as legitimate and compelling indicia of
intoxication. In addition to the substantive flaws in this approach, to which
attention will be turned directly, it is also worth noting that a fiction is thus
being perpetuated regarding the role of juries and the law/fact distinction.
Courts are simultaneously asserting that intoxication—whether? how
much? which effects?—is a matter for the jury, while exerting considerable
influence on how the inquiry is framed.118
Strikingly, even in ‘‘classic’’ cases where the central intoxication-related
issue was whether the accused formed the requisite specific intent for the
crime, judges were inclined to explain the concept of intoxication, less in
terms of cognition and intent formation (which surely would require
deference to experts of alcohol and other drugs and psychology), and more
in terms of the ability to perform motor skill activities, based on common
knowledge about the relationship between alcohol use and control over
116. Id. at { 60.
117. Id. at { 19.
118. This blurring of the tribunal of fact/tribunal of law distinction is not unique to trials
in which intoxication evidence features; see, e.g., the seminal House of Lords decision in
DPP v. Stonehouse [1978] AC 55 (U.K.) regarding the law of criminal attempts, and the role
of judge and jury.
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bodily functions. This approach appears to involve a significant blurring of
the distinction between intention and voluntariness.119 In addition, when
faced with ‘‘scientific’’ evidence of the accused’s intoxication (e.g., a blood
alcohol concentration reading), and/or expert evidence about the likely
effects of such a level of intoxication, there was a recurring tendency to
prefer ‘‘lay’’ evidence more consonant with common knowledge. The Aus-
tralian Capital Territory case of Byrne v. R120 is a good example of the
tendency to rely on evidence of mechanical function to prove cognitive
intent. The trial judge found that the accused, ‘‘although he had been
somewhat intoxicated . . . he must have been generally in control of his
mental faculties as he had been able to exercise good physical control.’’121
The case of Blackwell v. R is also illustrative.122 It was not in doubt that
the accused was intoxicated when he glassed the victim; the contested issue
was ‘‘the extent of his intoxication.’’123 The New South Wales Court of
Criminal Appeal observed:
Whilst there was evidence that the appellant was intoxicated, it was very
much a matter for the jury to determine whether his level of intoxication was
such that he was not capable of forming the relevant intent.124
Although there was other evidence that the appellant’s level of intoxication
may have been high, that evidence needed to be assessed in the context of all
the circumstances, which included, at the time that the police officers
arrived at the scene, that the appellant had been manhandled both by the
off-duty police officers and by the security guards. It was also open to the
jury to accept Mr McGuiness’ evidence. If they did so, that was also evi-
dence which supported the verdict.125
Mr. McGuiness was the pub licensee who, along with a pub security guard,
had given evidence that the accused was not intoxicated.126 Note the
119. Sometimes judges employed a vague colloquial hybrid phrase that posed the relevant
question as: was the accused ‘‘in control of his faculties’’; e.g., Catley v. R [2014] NSWCCA
249, {{ 28–29.
120. Byrne v. R [2014] ACTCA 31.
121. Id. at { 23.
122. Blackwell v. R [2011] NSWCCA 93.
123. Id. at { 97.
124. Id. at { 105.
125. Id. at { 107.
126. Id. at{{ 23–24, 26. There was no judicial comment on the credibility and reliability
of the evidence of the licensee, given the incentive to avoid characterizing the accused as
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licensee’s approach to defining intoxication, which was effectively endorsed
by the trial judge and the Court of Criminal Appeal:
Mr McGuiness also expressed the opinion that the appellant was not in-
toxicated: he said that the appellant was not slurring his words, was not
falling over, or in any way showing signs of intoxication. He said that the
appellant did not lose his balance and he wasn’t crying or mumbling.127
As the following extract explains, an important part of the Crown’s case
that the accused had the requisite intent was that, immediately prior to the
attack, he was capable of performing a number of functions:
The Crown’s position was that the appellant’s level of intoxication was not
such as to deprive him of the ability of forming the necessary intention, that
is, to inflict grievous bodily harm. Its case was that the appellant, some few
minutes before the incident, was functioning reasonably, as evidenced by
the fact that he was able to communicate with bar staff, had ordered drinks
and paid for them with his credit card. The Crown’s case in this regard was
supported by the CCTV footage.128
Table 3 provides extracts (with emphasis added) from a selection of
cases to illustrate the tendency of courts to focus on evidence of physical/
motor functionality, and the amount of force used by the accused, as
bases for inferring intention. These were not isolated examples. There
were a number of instances where judges articulated or endorsed an
approach to making an inference about the cognitive process of intent
formation that relies heavily on evidence of the mechanical functions that
the accused was able to perform.129 These findings are consistent with
Valverde’s observation that the legal construction of intoxication involves
an assumption that ‘‘[d]runkenness . . . is something that can be directly
intoxicated. Evidence of a licensee that the accused was intoxicated would have the potential
to be self-incriminatory in the context of liquor licensing law offenses (e.g., serving alcohol
to an intoxicated person). Note also the contrary assessment of a police officer: ‘‘Detective
Senior Constable Veitch . . . gave evidence that the entry in the police custody records in
relation to the appellant was, ‘When arrived at charge room exhibited signs of moderate to
serious intoxication evidenced by unsteady on feet, smell of alcohol, glassy eyes, slurred
speech’’’ (at { 27).
127. Id. at { 26.
128. Blackwell v. R [2011] NSWCCA 93, { 97.
129. See also Babic v. R [2010] VSCA 198; R v. Bacon [2012] QCA 340; Hegarty v. R
[2012] VSCA 2012; R v. Huni [2014] QCA 324.
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Table 3. Illustration of ‘‘Tests’’ for Assessing Relevance of Intoxication to Intent
Formation
Extract Case
Now, of course, you can see the [appellant] on the CCTV, the
images and he is not obviously drunk. He is certainly capable of
walking and talking and capable, you may have thought, of
forming an intention. He was capable of inflicting serious injury.
R v. Barden [2010]
QCA 374, { 7
Intoxication . . .will not ordinarily prevent an accused from
performing an intentional act, nor from intending the
consequences of those acts and, accordingly, does not affect
the accused’s criminal liability for those acts. But the intoxication
may reach a point of such intensity that the accused’s mind will
become separated from the movements of his body so that
such movements are truly involuntary and/or unintentional, and
that is the point that must be reached before someone is not
legally responsible for their actions or their intentions.
Babic v. R [2010]
VSCA 198, { 106 [a]
Whilst the evidence established that both the appellant and the
deceased were well affected by alcohol when they left the hotel,
the evidence does not go so far as to establish that the appellant
was ‘‘blind drunk’’ or unable to function or find his way home.
Shepherd v. R [2011]
NSWCCA 245, {
192 [b]
. . . [T]he appellant recognised his brother and rebuffed his
brother’s suggestion that he should stop assaulting the
deceased, the appellant was able to pick up a very large bin and
strike his intended victim with it, the appellant referred to blood
and killing the deceased, the appellant said that he was destined
for jail in any event, and the appellant complied promptly with
police directions. When that evidence is taken into account
together with the evidence that the appellant repeatedly kicked
the prone deceased in the head with steel capped boots over
a prolonged period, the proper conclusion is that it was
reasonably open to the jury to infer that, despite the very high
degree of the appellant’s intoxication, he killed the deceased
with the intention of doing him grievous bodily harm.
R v. Mitchell [2013]
QCA 248, { 15
Whilst he was plainly intoxicated, I am satisfied beyond
reasonable doubt that he was not so intoxicated that he did not
form an intent to burgle the deceased’s house . . . In particular,
the evidence that the appellant had left his DNA on Mrs Mabb’s
handbag . . . indicating that he had rifled through it, points to
a directed and deliberate course of conduct; which in my view
rules out intoxication to such an extent that he could not form
the necessary intent for burglary or, indeed, murder . . . . While
there was undoubtedly evidence of the appellant’s intoxication
R v. George [2013]
QCA 267, {{ 67,
69, 73
(continued)
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‘seen’ or ‘observed’.’’130 But whatever misgivings there may be about the
validity of such a conception of intoxication in the liquor licensing con-
text—where what is at stake is, for example, whether a licensee (or his or her
employee) has served alcohol to an intoxicated person131—they are amplified
where the nature of the inquiry is how alcohol and other drug consumption
has affected the executive cognitive function of an alleged violent offender.
The preference for lay assessment based on observable functionality in
the cases in this study’s dataset was especially striking in cases where there
was evidence of the offender’s blood alcohol concentration at the time of
the conduct in question. For example, in R v. Martin,132 based on a sample
taken several hours later, it was estimated by a government medical officer
that the offender’s blood alcohol concentration was between 0.264
and 0.454.133 In addition, the medical officer gave evidence of the likely
effects of intoxication at such levels:
Although there would be individual variation, at a blood alcohol level of 0.3,
generally speaking, a person would be visibly intoxicated, with stupor and an
adversely affected gait, to the point of being unable to stand. It would also be
likely to cause memory loss, blackouts and urinary incontinence. . . . At
a blood alcohol level of 0.3 a person could not walk a straight line, would
have difficulty putting a finger to the nose when asked and there would be
TABLE 3. (continued)
Extract Case
the evidence also conveyed the presence of obviously
purposeful conduct. This included multiple applications of blunt
force trauma to the heads of both deceased as well as trauma to
the chest of the female deceased sufficient to dissect her
coronary artery. The degree of force used bespoke an intention to
at least do grievous bodily harm. Moreover this was not a case of
some apparently spontaneous, drunken, unthinking behaviour.
a. The Victorian Court of Appeal accepted that, in this passage, the trial judge had blurred voluntariness and
intent, but concluded that overall the jury had not been misdirected.
b. The Court commented, inter alia, on the accused’s ability to walk from the pub to the scene of the crime,
and wash himself ({{ 131, 132).
130. VALVERDE, supra note 10, at 188.
131. Id. at 172f.
132. R v. Martin [2011] QCA 342.
133. Id. at { 65.
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other visible signs of intoxication, including a real difficulty in engaging in
meaningful conversation.134
Nonetheless, the Court attached greater significance to other evidence,
specifically evidence of what the accused could do:
It is true that the blood alcohol reading taken from the appellant well after his
arrest strongly suggested that at the time the police arrived late on 20
December he was heavily intoxicated. But other objective evidence, although
confirming that he had been drinking throughout the day and into the
evening, did not suggest that he was heavily intoxicated when he left the Bowls
Club at about 7.45 pm. The appellant’s extremely high level of intoxication
when the police arrived shortly before midnight may have been because he
drank a great deal after stabbing the deceased, perhaps to drown a guilty
conscience as he realised the enormity and finality of his deadly deeds.
. . . During the 000 call, the jury may have considered he deliberately avoided
giving his name to escape detection. Later when talking to police officer
Geraghty, he gave a falsely exculpatory version to cover up what he had done.
Neither of these matters suggested that he was so intoxicated he did not form
an intent to kill or to do grievous bodily harm to the deceased at the time of the
killing. Importantly, the number, positioning and depth of the stab wounds
described by the pathologist strongly supported a deadly intent to kill.135
The South Australian case of R v. Humbles136 provides another strong
illustration of this tendency. At the judge-alone trial, experts gave evidence
that the accused’s blood alcohol concentration was 0.252–0.284 at the time of
the commission of the offense, and that at such a level, his ‘‘ability to think
through the consequences of his actions would be grossly impaired.’’137
Nonetheless, the trial judge concluded that the Crown had established
beyond reasonable doubt that the accused had the intention to kill. Reflect-
ing the functional common knowledge approach to intoxication identified in
this article, the judge drew attention to evidence of various tasks that the
accused had been able to perform (e.g., cock and point the gun) and other
behaviors (e.g., ‘‘he had the presence of mind to flee’’; and he gave coherent
answers to basic police questions such as a request for his identity).138 On the
expert evidence provided, the trial judge said:
134. Id.
135. R v. Martin [2011] QCA 342, {{ 68, 71.
136. R v. Humbles [2014] SASCFC 91.
137. Id. at { 17.
138. Id. at { 25.
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I accept their evidence that there can be circumstances where the ingestion
of alcohol and drugs can impair a person’s state and presence of mind to the
extent that they may be incapable of forming an intention beyond that of
basic intent. However, for the reasons I have given, I find it proved beyond
reasonable doubt that such circumstances did not exist in this case. . . .
Although his condition was one of gross intoxication and his behaviour was
in many ways bizarre, nevertheless I find it proved beyond reasonable doubt
that the [defendant] had the intention . . . to kill.139
On appeal, the Full Court supported the trial judge’s analysis:
The Judge’s recounting of the effect of the medical evidence was entirely
accurate. Both expert witnesses expressed the view that the ingestion of
alcohol and drugs can impair a person’s state and presence of mind. They
did express the opinion that this may lead to an incapability of forming
a specific intent. They did not express any opinion as to whether or not the
defendant did form the requisite specific intent. As the Judge observed, this
was a matter on which the finder of fact was to reach a conclusion having
regard to all the evidence.140
This case does provide further evidence of a judicial reluctance to
yield dominion over the concept of intoxication to medical/scientific
experts, preferring to allow legally shaped, common knowledge under-
standings to provide the primary reference point for decision making.
The comments of the Queensland Court of Appeal in R v. Davis141 provide
a further illustration:
Dr Butler considered it a mere possibility that his capacity to form that
intention was severely impaired by his amphetamine intoxication. Even if it
were so impaired, there would still have been a residual capacity to form the
intent. There was other evidence (particularly the number of shots fired and
the pressure needed to engage the trigger) from which the jury could have
been so satisfied even in the face of Dr Butler’s opinion.142
The point being advanced is not that cases in which a ‘‘functional’’
approach was preferred and/or blood alcohol concentration and expert
evidence was not regarded as determinative, necessarily miscarried. Rather,
139. Id.
140. Id. at { 39.
141. R v. Davis [2012] QCA 97.
142. Id. at { 59. See also W. Austl. v. Silich (2011) 43 WAR 285, { 28; Namatjira v. R
[2013] NTCCA 08, {{ 32–34; McDougall v. R [2013] ACTCA 14, { 42.
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this article is drawing attention to an important question regarding the
nature of the concept of intoxication and how it is proven in criminal trials.
When courts are expressing views about the strength of the case against an
accused with respect to the formation of specific intent, even where there is
evidence of intoxication, it is not clear what theory of the relationship
between intoxication and intent formation they are bringing to the exer-
cise. It appears that ‘‘tests’’ that are better suited to assessing whether an
accused acted voluntarily, are being used to assess whether s/he acted with
a particular intention. Predicting a person’s level of intoxication based on
observed behavior is well known to be very difficult—even for trained
health professionals.143 Attempts to reach a conclusion about a particular
complex element of intoxication—that is, the effect on intent formation—
are likely to be even more challenging, especially for persons without
training, expertise, or experience in the task.
Intent formation is part of executive cognitive function, which has been
defined as ‘‘a subset of cognitive capacities encompassing a variety of higher
order cognitive abilities, such as attention, abstract reasoning, organization,
mental flexibility, planning, self-monitoring, and the ability to use external
feedback to moderate personal behavior.’’144 Experimental research sup-
ports the view that intoxication diminishes executive cognitive function.145
To the extent that the criminal law recognizes, in principle, that intoxica-
tion may impede intent formation, the law can be said to be generally in
sync with the scientific evidence. However, when it comes to the operatio-
nalization of this principle, a significant gap is apparent. Specifically, the
research literature does not support the deployment of de facto field tests
143. Robin Room, The relation between blood alcohol content and clinically assessed
intoxication: Lessons from applying the ICD-10 Y90 and Y91 codes in the emergency room, in
WORLD HEALTH ORGANISATION, ALCOHOL AND INJURIES: EMERGENCY DEPARTMENT
STUDIES IN AN INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVE 149–60 (C. Cherpitel et al. eds., 2009).
144. Robert O. Pihl, Alcohol Affects Executive Cognitive Functioning Differentially on the
Ascending Versus Descending Limb of the Blood Alcohol Concentration Curve, 27(5) ALCO-
HOLISM: CLINICAL & EXPERIMENTAL RES. 773, 773 (2003); citing Alan Baddeley & Sergio
Della Sala, Working memory and executive control, in THE PREFRONTAL CORTEX: EXECU-
TIVE AND COGNITIVE FUNCTIONS (A.C. Roberts et al. eds., 1998).
145. For example, Jordan B. Peterson et al., Acute alcohol intoxication and cognitive
functioning, 51 J. STUD. ON ALCOHOL 114 (1990); M. Oscar-Berman & K. Marinkovic,
Alcohol: Effects on neurobehavioral functions and the brain, 17 NEUROPSYCHOLOGICAL REV.
239 (2007).
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that focus heavily on observed motor skill performance as a basis for
assessing cognitive functions like intent formation.146
CONCLUS ION
This article confirms that alongside the problem of statutory under-
definition,147 the concept of intoxication in Australian criminal law is also
characterized by a lack of judicial precision. Although the concept is
routinely operationalized in courts at all levels—by prosecutors, defense
lawyers, magistrates, judges, and juries—the meaning of ‘‘intoxication’’
remains elusive. And yet the review of appellate decisions on which this
article reports revealed no evidence that the courts have recognized that
there is a deficit. Courts regularly deploy ‘‘common knowledge’’—a mix-
ture of ‘‘facts,’’ opinions, and attitudes about alcohol and other drug
consumption and intoxication—which jurors are assumed to already have,
and to which judges provide shape and ‘‘juridical capital.’’148 Australian
courts appear disinclined to allow medical and scientific expertise on the
effects of alcohol and other drugs to exert authoritative influence on the
criminal law concept of intoxication. In the cases reviewed, there was very
little explicit appreciation that lay expertise may be an inadequate foun-
dation for making complex inferential assessments of cognitive processes
like intent formation.
It is recognized that these criticisms need to be contextualized in light of
the fact that all of the relevant cases in this study’s dataset involve very
serious crimes of violence, including murder, very serious assaults, and
sexual assaults. In such cases, the gravity of the harm done, and of the
crimes alleged, means that courts are necessarily involved in an exercise that
requires balancing two imperatives: fidelity to strict legal principles of crim-
inal responsibility (and a corresponding openness to any evidence that may
raise reasonable doubt), and community expectations about condemning
and deterring intoxicated-related violence. This balancing exercise is not
a new one. It is a manifestation of the tension that has been evident in
146. See Raymond C.K. Chan et al., Assessment of executive functions: Review of instru-
ments and identification of critical issues, 23 ARCHIVES OF CLINICAL NEUROPSYCHOLOGY 201
(2008).
147. Quilter et al., supra note 3, at 935.
148. VALVERDE, supra note 10, at 171.
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jurisprudential debates at least since the 19th century.149 It echoes the
competing policy arguments in the landmark intoxication decisions of
DPP v. Majewski (House of Lords)150 and O’Connor (High Court of
Australia),151 described by Mason J, in the latter case, as follows:
On the one hand, there are two strands of thought whose thrust is to deny
that drunkenness is an excuse for the commission of crime. One is essentially
a moral judgment—that it is wrong that a person should escape responsi-
bility for his actions merely because he is so intoxicated by drink or drugs
that his act is not willed when by his own voluntary choice he embarked on
the course which led to his intoxication. The other is a social judgment—
that society legitimately expects for its protection that the law will not allow
to go unpunished an act which would be adjudged to be a serious criminal
offence but for the fact that the perpetrator is grossly intoxicated. . . . On the
other hand, there is the force of the general principle of criminal responsi-
bility that a criminal act needs to be voluntary.152
To the extent that the present Australian study found evidence of a judicial
reluctance to cede responsibility for framing the criminal law concept of
intoxication to experts, and an unwillingness to render the inquiry an
exclusively scientific one, it is likely that at least part of the explanation lies
in the fact that there is a moral dimension to the determination of criminal
responsibility.153
Nonetheless, it is submitted that there is reason to be concerned about
the mechanisms by which these challenging tensions and balancing exer-
cises are being navigated. Reliance on common knowledge, and the deploy-
ment of ‘‘tests’’ based on a person’s observable mechanical functions as
a sort of ‘‘proxy’’ for a state of intoxication that is sufficient to impede
intent formation (or other cognitive processes) are not, it is submitted, an
149. See, generally, LOUGHNAN, supra note 11, at ch. 7; also Roth, supra note 57; Mitchell
Keiter, Just Say No to Excuse: The Rise and Fall of the Intoxication Defense, 87(2) J. CRIM. L.
& CRIMINOLOGY 482 (1997).
150. DPP v. Majewski [1977] AC 443.
151. R v. O’Connor (1980) 146 CLR 64.
152. Id. at { 15. See also the United States Supreme Court’s decision in Montana v.
Egelhoff 116 S. Ct. 2013 (1996); and the Supreme Court of Canada’s decision in Daviault v.
The Queen [1994] 3 SCR 63.
153. It is noteworthy and revealing that in the sentencing context—where punishment
rather than responsibility is in issue—judges appear more willing to rely on expert evidence,
particularly where the offender’s intoxication was associated with mental illness; McNamara
et al., supra note 8, at 174–84.
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adequate compromise. The additional problems raised by the need to assess
claims of intoxication attributable to drugs other than alcohol (or a com-
bination of alcohol and drugs)—where familiarity and ‘‘common sense’’ are
even less likely to be adequate—must also be acknowledged. In 1990,
McCord observed that, even if it is believed (as he did) that:
moral judgment should be the ultimate goal of the law in this area . . . moral
judgment cannot be intelligently made without first securing the best pos-
sible understanding of the physiological effects of alcohol on human mental
functioning. Thus, the direction for further research is clear: find out what
science has to tell the law about the physiological effects of alcohol.154
More than 25 years later, the point remains apposite in the case of alcohol,
and even more so, in the case of other psychoactive substances.155 Further
research could usefully investigate whether there is a more satisfactory middle
ground in which space is created for more fine-grained expert guidance on
the implications of alcohol and other drug consumption for specific physical
and cognitive functions. Specifically, criminal court decision making would
benefit from guidance that maps more closely to the discrete inquiries with
which a particular trial is concerned, and which more precisely delineates and
appreciates the different effects of different drugs.
154. McCord, supra note 88, at 389.
155. See WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION, supra note 36.
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